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Abstract
We study the use of a bipolar decision structure called BLF (bipolar leveled framework) in the context
of collective decision making where the vote consists in giving factual information about a candidate
which the group should accept or reject. A BLF defines the set of possible decision principles that may
be used in order to evaluate the admissibility of a given candidate. A decision principle is a rule that
relates some observations about the candidate to a given goal that the selection of this candidate may
achieve or miss. The decision principles are ordered accordingly to the importance of the goal they
support. Oppositions to decision principles are also described in the BLF under the form of observations
that contradict the realization of the decision principles. We show how the use of a common BLF may
reduce the impact of manipulation strategies in the context of group decision making.
Keyword: Group decision making, Qualitative decision theory, Arguments.
1 Introduction
A standard way [16] to handle a decision problem is to define a utility function which enables the decision
maker to evaluate the quality of each decision and select the one that have the best utility. This utility func-
tion should be designed in order to take into account the multi-criteria aspects of the problem. The classical
approaches for handling collective decision problems under uncertainty are based on (i) the identification
of a decision making theory under uncertainty that captures the decision makers’ behaviour with respect
to uncertainty and (ii) the specification of a collective utility function (CUF) as it may be used when the
problem is not pervaded with uncertainty [5].
In classical decision problems, all candidates are available to the decision maker simultaneously and
he must choose one preferred candidate among them. Our approach deals with a different case of decision
like the “secretary problem” (see e.g. [15]) where an administrator wants to hire the best secretary. In this
case, only one candidate is evaluated at a time and a decision about each particular applicant is to be made
immediately after the interview. Once rejected, an applicant cannot be recalled. Hence the decision maker
should decide whether to make a final choice or continue searching for better candidates. In this kind of
problem, the aim is not to compute the best candidate among all the possible candidates, but rather to select
a candidate that is convenient wrt some criterias. We capture the notion of convenience by introducing
“admissibility statuses” where the admissibility of a candidate is given in terms of the goals that would be
achieved by accepting her, the goals are positive or negative and some are more important to achieve than
others.
Recently, a framework based on default rules have been proposed by [12] for decision under uncer-
tainty. Its aim was to propose a new rational model for decision making in the presence of incomplete
knowledge, through the definition of clear admissibility criteria by taking advantage of the notions of effi-
ciency and simplicity that are central in industrial domain. In particular the authors were inspired from the
protocols promoted in business practices guidelines like the “Collaborative Planning, Forecasting and Re-
plenishment” model [14]. This protocol aims at coordinating the supply chain from strategic to operational
∗This is a draft version, the paper is published in the proceedings of PRIMA’2017.
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decision: at the end, the agents should select a production plan (the candidate) that will be convenient for
all the members of the supply chain. In this context the knowledge is incomplete and distributed since all
the consequences of a production policy (i.e. the selection of a given production plan) are not known by
all the particular participants of the supply chain and agents usually do not want to make all their knowl-
edge public. This paper has defined a new representation framework for decision making, called Bipolar
Leveled Framework (BLF), which was first introduced in [3]. The BLF is a bipolar structure that enables
the decision maker to visualize the attributes and goals that are involved in the decision problem, together
with their inhibitors and their importance levels. Informally, a BLF may be viewed as a kind of qualitative
utility function with some extra features: 1) the defeasible links between attributes and goals are made ex-
plicit into what is called “decision principles”, 2) an opposition to a decision principle, called “inhibitor”,
is represented by an arc directed towards it, 3) the importance levels of decision principles are represented
by the height of their position in the structure. The BLF can be established either by one person or by a
group of people in order to define a decision making framework which will be instantiated when candidates
will be evaluated.
In this paper we propose to use a BLF in the collective decision problem to accept or reject a candidate.
We propose to organize the decision by letting agents vote about the features that hold for the candidate but
agents are never allowed to vote about the goals that would be achieved by selecting the candidate. Hence
we separate the decision into three phases, the phase where the criteria associated to a good decision are
defined (the BLF construction which is out of the scope of this paper), the phase where the candidates are
evaluated by the voters, and the final decision to accept or reject the candidate (which is an automatic phase
using the BLF with the precise features concerning the current candidate). In the literature the specification
of a CUF is an aggregation of the agent preferences hence this is somewhat mixing the three phases.
Moreover, in order to show that this rich and visual framework is well founded we show how the use of a
common BLF may reduce the impact of manipulation strategies in the context of group decision making.
The term manipulation is used in a weak sense, since the results presented are not of a game-theoretic
nature, in particular, they do not admit deviating behavior. However since agents have the right to omit
some information we consider that this behavior is a kind of manipulation.
2 Decision making with a BLF
2.1 BLF: a structure encoding decision criteria
We consider a set C of candidates1 about which some information is available and two languages LF (a
propositional language based on a vocabulary VF ) representing information about some features that are
believed to hold for a candidate and LG (another propositional language based on a distinct vocabulary
VG) representing information about the achievement of some goals when a candidate is selected. In the
propositional languages used here, the logical connectors “or”, “and”, “not” are denoted respectively by ∨,
∧, and ¬. A literal is a propositional symbol x or its negation ¬x, the set of literals ofLG are denoted by
LITG. Classical inference, logical equivalence and contradiction are denoted respectively by |=,≡,⊥. The
reason why we propose two distinct languages is to clearly differentiate beliefs (coming from observations)
from desires (goals to be achieved when selecting a candidate). In the following we denote by K a set of
formulas representing features that are believed to hold: hence K ⊆ LF is the available information.
Using the inference operator |=, the fact that a formula ϕ ∈ LF holds2 in K is written K |= ϕ.
The BLF is a structure that contains two kinds of information: decision principles and inhibitors. A de-
cision principle can be viewed as a defeasible reason enabling to reach a conclusion about the achievement
of a goal. More precisely, a decision principle is a pair (ϕ, g), it represents the default rule meaning that
“if the formula ϕ is believed to hold for a candidate then the goal g is a priori believed to be achieved by
selecting this candidate”:
Definition 1 (decision principle (DP)) A decision principle p is a pair (ϕ, g) ∈ LF × LITG, where ϕ
is the reason denoted reas(p) and g the conclusion of p denoted concl(p). P denotes the set of decision
principles.
1Candidates are also called alternatives in the literature.
2The agent’s knowledge K being considered to be certain, we write “ϕ holds” instead of “ϕ is believed to hold”.
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We illustrate the BLF notions on a toy example concerning a recruitment problem.
Example 1 If the candidates are people applying for a job then the decision principle (CV good readabil-
ity, ability to well present herself) could be understood as “if the candidate has a CV easy to read then a
priori the goal to have a person able to well present herself is achieved”.
Depending on whether the achievement of its goal is wished or dreaded, a decision principle may have
either a positive or a negative polarity. Moreover some decision principles are more important than others
because their goal is more important. The decision principles are totally ordered accordingly.
Definition 2 (polarity and importance) A function pol : VG → {⊕,	} gives the polarity of a goal g ∈
VG, this function is extended to goal literals by pol(¬g) = −pol(g) with −⊕ = 	 and −	 = ⊕. Decision
principles are polarized accordingly: pol(ϕ, g) = pol(g). The set of positive and negative goals are
abbreviated ⊕ and 	 respectively: ⊕ = {g ∈ LITG : pol(g) = ⊕} and 	 = {g ∈ LITG : pol(g) = 	}.
LITG is totally ordered by the relation  (“less or equally important than”). Decision principles are
ordered accordingly: (ϕ, g)  (ψ, g′) iff g  g′.
The polarities and the relative importances of the goals in VG are supposed to be given by the decision
maker. In the following example, the decision maker (our agent) may want to avoid to select an anti-social
person (hence ap is a negative goal), while selecting a candidate who is efficient for the job is a positive
goal, moreover he may give more importance to the efficiency for the job than to the ability to present
oneself. In this example we propose to affect the same importance to the negative goal to have a person not
efficient for the job ¬ej and to the positive goal to have an easy to train person et, since when a candidate
has those features it is difficult to say whether the positive outweights the negative or the reverse.
Example 2 Let us consider a recruitment problem. The recruitment is done according to the following
goals, listed with their abbreviation and polarity:
goal meaning polarity
ap we do not want someone with an anti-social personality 	
ej we want to hire an efficient person for the job ⊕
ph we want to find a person able to present herself ⊕
et we want to find a person easy to train ⊕
st we want to hire a stable person ⊕
Hence in this example LITG = {ap,¬ap, ej,¬ej, ph,¬ph, et,¬et, st,¬st}. The levels of the goals of
LITG are s.t.3 et ' ¬ej  ¬et  ap  ph ' ¬ph  ¬st  ¬ap ' ej ' st. These levels of importance
translate e.g. that finding an efficient and easy to train person is strictly more important than achieving
any of the three other goals.
The set of features VF describing a candidate is summarized in the following tables:
Feature Meaning Feature Meaning
cbs CV bad spelling cgr CV good readability
eb educational background gp good personality
i introverted candidate jhop job hopper
lpe long professional experience spe professional experience in
u unmotivated candidate the specialty of the job
A decision principle (ϕ, g) is a defeasible piece of information because sometimes there may exist some
reason ϕ′ to believe that it does not apply in the situation, this reason is called an inhibitor.
The fact that ϕ′ inhibits a decision principle (ϕ, g) is interpreted as follows: “when the decision maker
only knows ϕ∧ϕ′ then he is no longer certain that g is achieved”. In that case, the inhibition is represented
with an arc towards the decision principle. The decision principles and their inhibitors are supposed to be
given by the decision maker. An interpretation in terms of possibility theory is described in [12].
We are now in position to define the structure BLF.
3The equivalence relation associated to  is denoted ' (x ' y⇔ x  y and y  x) and the strict order is denoted ≺ ( x ≺ y
⇔ x  y and not y  x) hence x ' y represents the fact that the goals x and y are equally important, x  y that x is strictly more
important than y.
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Definition 3 (BLF) Given a set of goals VG , a BLF is a quadruplet (P,R, pol,) where P is a set of
decision principles ordered accordingly to their goals by  and with a polarity built on pol as defined in
Definition 2,R ⊆ (LF × P) is an inhibition relation.
The four elements of the BLF are supposed to be available prior to the decision and to be settled for
future decisions as if it was a kind of utility function. A graphical representation of a BLF is given below,
it is a tripartite graph represented in three columns, the DPs with a positive level are situated on the right
column, the inhibitors are in the middle, and the DPs with a negative polarity are situated on the left. The
more important (positive and negative) DPs are in the higher part of the graph, equally important DPs are
drawn at the same horizontal level. By convention the highest positive level is at the top right of the figure
and the lowest negative level is at the top left. The height of the inhibitors is not significant only their
existence is used.
⊕Inhib.	
(jhop ∧ ¬spe ∧ lpe, et)
(jhop ∧ lpe,¬et) ¬spe
(eb, ej) (spe, ej)u
gp
(cgr, ph)
(jhop ∧ lpe, ap) (i, ap) lpe
cbs
cgr(cbs,¬ph)
(jhop,¬st)
Figure 1: Recruitment BLF
Example 2 (continued): Figure 1 illustrates the BLF corresponding to Example 2. In this example, we
can see that it is different to have a decision principle with the negation of a goal like ¬et (not easy to
train) in (jhop ∧ lpe,¬et) (a job hopper with a long experience is not easy to train) from having an
inhibition u towards a DP with the goal et, here (jhop∧¬spe∧ lpe, et) (a job hopper non specialist with
a long experience is generally easy to train except when he is unmotivated). Note that the utility of ¬et is
considered, it has a disutility (at a lower level than the utility of et), but sometimes the utility of the opposite
goal is not considered as it is done for ¬ap here (which is translated by an attribution of the lowest utility).
In the following, the BLF (P,R, pol,) is set and we show how it can be used for analyzing the
acceptability of a candidate. First, we present the available information and the notion of instantiated BLF,
called valid-BLF.
Given a candidate c ∈ C , we consider that the knowledge of the decision maker about c has been
gathered in a knowledge baseKc withKc ⊆ LF . Given a formula ϕ describing a configuration of features
(ϕ ∈ LF ), the decision maker can have three kinds of knowledge about c: ϕ holds for candidate c (i.e.,
Kc |= ϕ), or not (Kc |= ¬ϕ) or the feature ϕ is unknown for c (Kc 6|= ϕ and Kc 6|= ¬ϕ). When there is no
ambiguity about the candidate c, Kc is denoted K.
Definition 4 (K-valid-BLF) Given a consistent knowledge base K, a K-valid-BLF is a quadruplet (PK ,
RK , pol, ) where
• PK = {(ϕ, g) ∈ P, s.t. K |= ϕ} is the set of DPs inP whose reason ϕ holds inK, called valid-DPs.
• RK = {(ϕ, p) ∈ R, s.t. K |= ϕ and p ∈ PK} is the set of valid inhibitions according to K.
When there is no ambiguity, we simply use “valid-BLF” instead of “K-valid-BLF”. The validity of a
DP only depends on the fact whether the features that constitute its reason ϕ hold or not, it does not depend
on its goal g since the link between the reasons and the goal is given in the BLF (hence it is no longer
questionable).
4
Example 2 (continued): The agent has information about a candidate c0: she is a job hopper jhop, with
a long personal experience, lpe, this experience is not in the specialty of the job ¬spe and the candidate
is unmotivated u but she has a CV with a good readability cgr. Figure 2 is the valid-BLF representing the
knowledge about c0.
⊕Inhib.	
(jhop ∧ ¬spe ∧ lpe, et)
(jhop ∧ lpe,¬et) ¬spe
u
(cgr, ph)
(jhop ∧ lpe, ap) lpe
cgr
(jhop,¬st)
Figure 2: Valid BLF with K = {jhop, lpe,¬spe, u, cgr}
Now in the valid-BLF the principles that are not inhibited are the ones that are going to be trusted. A
goal in VG is said to be realized if there is a valid-DP that is not inhibited by any valid-inhibitor.
Definition 5 (realized goal) Let g be a goal in LITG, g is realized w.r.t. a K-valid-BLF B = (PK , RK ,
pol, ) iff ∃(ϕ, g) ∈ PK and @(ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ RK .
The set of realized goals w.r.t. B is denoted R(B), the positive and negative realized goals are denoted by
R(B)⊕ = R(B) ∩ ⊕ and R(B)	 = R(B) ∩ 	 respectively.
When there is no ambiguity about the BLF B, R(B) is simply denoted by R.
Example 2 (continued): The goals ¬et and et are not realized for candidate c0 since the inhibitions ¬spe
and u are valid. Two negative goals, ap and ¬st, and one positive goal, ph, are realized.
In Section 2.2 we explain how to use a BLF in order to make a decision. The decision consists in saying
whether or not a candidate is admissible based on the goals that are realized in its corresponding valid-BLF.
2.2 Admissibility statuses of candidates
The admissibility status of a candidate c is computed from a BLF and a knowledge base Kc describing
what is known about c, its correspondingKc-valid-BLF should be denoted 〈PKc ,RKc , pol, 〉. However,
when there is no ambiguity about the knowledge available, PKc is denoted P andRKc is abbreviatedR.
We first define the notion of order of magnitude which requires to define the levels of a set of goals.
We attribute levels to sets of goals starting from the least important ones that are assigned a level 1 and
stepping by one each time the importance grows.
Definition 6 (levels and order of magnitude) Given a set of goals G ⊆ LITG and the relation  on
LITG, the levels of G are defined by induction:
• G1 = {g ∈ G : @g′ ∈ G s.t. g′ ≺ g}
• Gi+1 = {g ∈ G : @g′ ∈ G \ (
⋃i
k=1Gk) s.t. g
′ ≺ g}
The order of magnitude of G is: OM(G) = maxg∈G{λ : g ∈ Gλ} with OM(∅) = 0.
Definition 7 (admissibility status) Given a candidate c ∈ C , given the knowledge Kc about c and given
a Kc-valid-BLF 〈P,R, pol,〉. The status of c is:
- necessarily admissible if R⊕M 6= ∅ and R	M = ∅
- possibly admissible if R⊕M 6= ∅
- indifferent if R = ∅
- possibly inadmissible if R	M 6= ∅
- necessarily inadmissible if R	M 6= ∅ and R⊕M = ∅
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- controversial if R⊕M 6= ∅ and R	M 6= ∅
where M = OM(R) (hence RM is the set of most important realized goals).
We respectively denote byNad, Πad, Id, Π¬ad, N¬ad and Ct the set of necessarily admissible, possibly
admissible, indifferent, possibly inadmissible, necessarily inadmissible and controversial candidates.
In other words, a necessarily admissible candidate is supported by positive principles with goals of
maximum importance that are realized (i.e., uninhibited) and all the negative goals of the same importance
do not hold. A possibly admissible candidate has at least one uninhibited positive principle of maximum
importance in its favor. An indifferent candidate4 is not concerned by any uninhibited principle (nor posi-
tive nor negative), while a controversial candidate is both supported and criticized by uninhibited DPs of
maximum importance We define three sets of admissibility:
• S1 = Nad, in this set, the candidates are admissible with no doubt, there are uninhibited principles
about the candidates which are all positive.
• Since there are two ways to have doubts about a candidate, namely when she is indifferent (Id) or
controversial (Ct), we define two weaker sets:
– S2a = Nad ∪ Id (i.e., S2a = C \ Π¬ad). In this set, we place candidates of S1 together with
those for which no uninhibited principle is available (neither positive nor negative),
– S2b = Nad ∪ Ct (i.e., S2b = Πad ). It gathers S1 together with the candidates that are
concerned by negative uninhibited principles provided that they are also concerned at least by
one positive uninhibited principle.
• S3 = Id ∪ Ct ∪Nad (i.e., Πad ∪ Id = C \N¬ad). It contains also S1.
Note that in this paper we focus on the question whether to accept or not a given candidate. Regarding
the question about the selection of one candidate among a set of candidates, different rules [7] have been
proposed for comparing candidates in a qualitative bipolar decision framework and have been adapted to
the BLF setting [12].
Example 2 (continued): The status of the candidate c0 is necessarily inadmissible since only ap, ph and
¬st are realized in her valid BLF, but ap  ph and pol(ap) = 	. Hence c0 will not be accepted since the
most important realized goal for her is negative.
3 Vote between several agents under a common BLF
The BLF demonstrates the full extent of its usefulness in the case where knowledge is distributed over
several agents who have personal preferences but who want to collaborate in order to make a good decision
for the group. In this paper, we focus on the case where the agents vote in order to accept or reject one
candidate. The vote action consists in revealing that some feature holds or not (wrt to the agent knowledge).
In order to evaluate the BLF with regard to manipulation, we are going to consider that each agent has
some private preferences about the candidates i.e. she may want to support one candidate or not. However,
we assume that the common knowledge is consistent and that agent can not lie, hence, two agents cannot
utter contradictory facts.
More formally, we consider a set V of agents (voters), each agent v ∈ V divides the set of candidates
C into two subsets C+v and C
−
v . c ∈ C+v means that the agent v is in favor of the candidate c and c ∈ C−v
means that the agent v is against accepting c. In this section we propose several vote strategies and study the
relation between the strategies and the admissible thresholds. Each agent has her own private knowledge,
Kv , and we suppose that the set of all the available knowledge K (K =
⋃
v∈V Kv) is consistent, however
each agent does not know the private knowledge of the other agents.
Let V otedsv ⊆ LF be the set of voted formulas under strategy s by the agent v i.e. f ∈ V otedsv if under
strategy s the agent v gives the information that f holds to the group (the subscript v will be forgotten when
4Note that the indifference definition uses R and not RM .
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there is no ambiguity about the agent). In this paper we define two strategies, the optimistic strategy (Def-
inition 8) and the pessimistic strategy (Definition 9). In the vote procedure, we impose that the agents are
only allowed to use literals extracted from the BLF: more formally, let LITF =
⋃
a∈P,x∈reas(a){x,¬x},
∀s,∀v ∈ V, V otedsv ⊆ LITF . In other words, the BLF defines the vocabulary that can be used for voting.
3.1 Optimistic and pessimistic strategies
In the following definition we slightly abuse notations by using f ∈ ϕ with f being a literal, it means that
the variable on which f is built appears in ϕ, i.e., ∀f ∈ LITF , f ∈ ϕ is a shortcut for ((f is a variable
and f ∈ ϕ) or (f = ¬x and x is a variable s.t. x ∈ ϕ)). We call optimistic strategy Def.8 (or Confident
strategy) a strategy in which as soon as something is in a positive decision principle or in an inhibitor of
a negative decision principle the agent will utter it without looking at the possible negative effect of this
utterance. More formally:
Definition 8 (Optimistic strategy) Let v ∈ V be a agent and c ∈ C a candidate such that c ∈ C+v , let
Kv,c the facts that are known by v about c. Let us consider (P,R, pod,) a BLF with (Pc,Rc, pod,)
the associated Kv,c-valid BLF. The optimistic strategy is: ∀f ∈ LITF ,
f ∈ V otedov iff
 Kv,c ` fand ( ∃p ∈ P⊕c s.t. f ∈ reas(p) and f ∧ reas(p) 0 ⊥or ∃(ϕ, p) ∈ R	c s.t. f ∈ ϕ and f ∧ ϕ 0 ⊥)
where
P⊕c = {(ϕ, g) ∈ Pc s.t. g ∈ ⊕} is the set of DPs in the Kv,c-valid BLF that have a positive goal and
R	c = {(ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ Rc s.t. g ∈ 	} denotes the set of inhibition that inhibit a DP with a negative goal
in the Kv,c-valid BLF.
In other words the optimistic strategy consists in giving all5 the literals that are known to hold and that
appear either in a positive DP or in a inhibitor of a negative DP as long as they are not inconsistent with
the reason of this positive DP, nor inconsistent with this inhibitor. Hence by using an optimistic strategy
the agent will give a lot of information, hoping that it will help to validate at least one positive DP or to
invalidate at least one negative DP.
Example 2 (continued): Let us suppose that the agent wants to accept the candidate c0. If she uses the
optimistic strategy then she will omit to say u because it does not appear in a positive DP nor in a Inhibitor
against a negative DP. The valid BLF obtained by the vote of this agent is described in Figure 3 with a
cross on the omitted literal. In this case the candidate becomes necessarily admissible.
⊕Inhib.	
(jhop ∧ ¬spe ∧ lpe, et)
(jhop ∧ lpe,¬et) ¬spe
u
(cgr, ph)
(jhop ∧ lpe, ap) lpe
cgr
(jhop,¬st)
Figure 3: Optimistic BLF with K = {jhop, lpe,¬spe, u, cgr}
Note that with the optimistic strategy, the agent would tell everything she knows as soon as there is a
possibility that other agents complete her vote in a favorable way.
Example 2 (continued): The agent utters jhop even if there is a negative unihibited DP (jhop ∧ lpe, ap).
Unfortunately, in our case, we know that lpe holds, hence by saying jhop it opens the way to validate the
negative DP, moreover the agent herself has uttered lpe (since she is a naive optimistic, a more skilled
strategy would reason more globally on the whole set of voted formulas, which would require a more
complex computation). Besides since the most important DP is inhibited by u, the agent takes the risk that
another agent utters u, in that case the candidate c0 would be necessarily rejected.
5Due to the use of “iff” in Definition 8.
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As we have seen, by using the optimistic strategy the agent may validate some negative DP. She can
also inhibit other positive DPs when the literal is present both in a reason for a positive DP and in an
inhibitor. The pessimistic approach is more cautious and check (naively) if a voted literal cannot create
collateral damages.
Definition 9 (Pessimistic strategy) Let v ∈ V be a agent and c ∈ C a candidate such that c ∈ C+v and
let Kv,c the facts that are known by v about c. Let us consider (P,R, pol,) a BLF with (Pc,Rc, pol,)
the associated Kv,c-valid BLF. The pessimistic strategy is: ∀f ∈ LITF ,
∀f ∈ LITF ,
f ∈ V otedpv iff

Kv,c ` f
and (∃p ∈ P⊕c s.t. f ∈ reas(p) and f ∧ reas(p) 0 ⊥
or ∃(ϕ, p) ∈ R	c s.t. f ∈ ϕ and f ∧ ϕ 0 ⊥)
and @p ∈ P	c such that f ∈ reas(p) and f ∧ reas(p) 0 ⊥
and @(ϕ, p) ∈ R⊕c s.t. f ∈ ϕ and f ∧ ϕ 0 ⊥)
where P⊕c is defined as before and
P	c = {(ϕ, g) ∈ Pc s.t. g ∈ 	} is the set of DPs in the Kv,c-valid BLF that have a negative goal andR	c
is defined as before and
R⊕c = {(ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ Rc s.t. g ∈ ⊕} denotes the set of inhibition that inhibit a DP with a positive goal in
the Kv,c-valid BLF.
In other words the pessimistic strategy consists in giving a piece of information f about a preferred
candidate only if it may help to validate positive DP or to inhibit negative DP, but if this piece cannot be
used against the candidate. Hence the agent with a pessimistic strategy will not utter a literal f if it could
help to validate a negative DP or if f could help to validate an inhibitor of a positive argument.
Example 2 (continued): If our agent uses the pessimistic strategy then she would omit to say u but would
also omit jhop and lpe. The valid BLF obtained by the vote of this agent is described in Figure 4 with the
only valid DP encircled by solid lines. In this case the candidate becomes necessarily admissible.
⊕Inhib.	
(jhop ∧ ¬spe ∧ lpe, et)
(jhop ∧ lpe,¬et) ¬spe
u
(cgr, ph)
(jhop ∧ lpe, ap) lpe
cgr
(jhop,¬st)
Figure 4: Pessimistic BLF with K = {jhop, lpe,¬spe, u, cgr}
We can notice that the pessimistic strategy is hiding a lot of information. Note that we have shown
the BLF obtained after the vote of only one agent, let us see in the next section what happens in presence
of several agents. The previous strategies are naive in the sense that they focus on each literal indepen-
dently while they could focus on achieving the goals. More complex strategy could be defined, namely
we could propose to select a set of literals which can be uttered together in order to influence admissibility
statuses.However, we are going to show that no strategy can guarantee to obtain the desired admissibility
status.
3.2 Analysis of the strategies
In this section, we study the properties of the optimistic and pessimistic strategies. First, let us recall
that global knowledge is assumed to be consistent. We also assume that the agents cannot lie (except by
omission). This comes from two reasons: first, idealy agents are gathered in order to take the best decision
for the group, hence they have a moral duty to do it honestly, second a lie may lead to an inconsistency hence
could be discovered by the group and cause the agent to be ashame. Hence the only way to manipulate the
vote is to omit to declare some pieces of information that they know.
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Proposition 1 6 ∀v ∈ V,∀s ∈ {o, p} Kv ` V otedsv and V otedsv 0 ⊥
Proposition 1 states that under optimistic and pessimistic strategy what is voted should be deduced
from the knowledge of the voters and it is consistent. The following proposition shows that the pessimistic
strategy cannot reveal more information than the optimistic one.
Proposition 2 ∀v ∈ V , V otedpv ⊆ V otedov
In the following, V oted is the set of voted knowledge and RK and RV oted denotes the set of realized
goals under total knowledge and voted knowledge respectively. We are now going to study the link between
strategies and the admissibility thresholds. Note that if all the agents use the optimistic strategy then
V oted =
⋃
v∈V V oted
o
v . The following propositions concern basic admissibility.
Proposition 3 ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∀v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v , if all the agents use the optimistic strategy, then R⊕K ⊆ R⊕V oted.
Note that the inclusion maybe strict since there maybe some positive goals which are realized by an
optimistic strategy made by all the agents but which are not realized under total knowledge, since they can
have inhibitors that would be omitted by the strategical agents. Hence there can be more positive realized
goals by using a global optimistic strategy than by sharing all the knowledge.
Proposition 4 ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∀v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v , if all the agents use the optimistic strategy then R	V oted ⊆ R	K .
Similarly as before, the inclusion maybe strict since there maybe some negative DP that are not val-
idated by the vote. Hence there can be less negative realized goals by using a global optimistic strategy
than by sharing all the knowledge. From propositions 3 and 4, it follows that under the optimistic strategy
used by all the agents, a candidate that is preferred by all the agents is not guaranteed to be accepted, this
depends on how the complete knowledge is shared and on the BLA structure. More precisely, we have:
Theorem 1 ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∀v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v , if all the agents use the optimistic strategy
- c ∈ Nad under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad under voted knowledge
- c ∈ Ct under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad ∪ Ct under voted knowledge
- c ∈ Id under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad ∪ Id under voted knowledge
- c ∈ N¬ad under total knowledge then c may have any status under voted knowledge (c ∈ Nad ∪ Id ∪
Ct ∪N¬ad).
The last point of Theorem 1 shows that a unanimity of personal preferences may lead to accept a
candidate which is not admissible for the group according to the BLF.
Example 3 To illustrate Theorem 1, we propose an example with 4 agents with c ∈ C+v with K1 = {eb,
¬spe}, K2 = {lpe, i}, K3 = {eb, cgr} and K4 = {i, u, cbs}. Using optimistic strategy V oted = {eb,
¬spe, lpe, cgr}. Hence, R⊕K = {ej, ph} and R	K = ∅ so the candidate is Nad while the candidate is Id
under total knowledge (see Figure ??). Note that Agent 4’s preferences are totally in contradiction with its
valid-BLF. This contradiction allows Agent 4 to omit information in order to increase the accepted status
of the candidate. One can see that if Agent 4 changes its personal preferences the candidate becomes Id.
⊕Inhib.	
¬spe
(eb, ej)u
(cgr, ph)
(i, ap) lpe
cbs
cgr
Fig.5 K = {eb, ¬spe} ∪ {lpe, i} ∪ {eb, cgr} ∪ {i, u, cbs}, Voted={eb, ¬spe, lpe, cgr}
Let us study the pessimistic strategy. Note that under this strategy, the realized goals may e pessimistic
differ from what could have been obtained by having the whole information.
6The proofs are in Annex.
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Proposition 5 If all the agents use the pessimistic strategy then R	V oted = ∅.
R⊕V oted can be different from R
⊕
K (i.e., we can have R
⊕
V oted * R
⊕
K and R
⊕
K * R
⊕
V oted). Since we
may have some positive DPs that can be uninhibited by voted DPs while they are inhibited under complete
knowledge, and we may also have some positive DPs that contains facts that belong to inhibitors of positive
DPs or that belong to negative DPs that will not be valid under voted knowledge while they would be
validated by sharing the complete knowledge.
From Proposition 5 it follows that a candidate that is preferred by all agents is either necessary admis-
sible or indifferent when the pessimistic strategy is used by everyone:
Corollary 1 ∀c ∈ C , if all the agents use pessimistic strategy and if c is s.t. ∀v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v then
c ∈ Nad ∪ Id under voted knowledge.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 show the impact of the unanimity of the agents’ preferences on the satisfac-
tion of the group. Optimistic strategy can increase the evaluation of a candidate but this may be impossible
to do if there is no feature that holds (under total knowledge) that can help to produce a DP in favor of
the candidate. Concerning pessimistic strategy, even if it is naive, the possibilities of manipulation of the
results are limited, i.e., it cannot transform a candidate which is preferred by all the agents into a necessary
admissible candidate, sometimes the best they can obtain will be Id (for instance when the agents possess
only bad features for this candidate, then they will say nothing, hence the candidate will be considered as
indifferent).
We are now in position to relate the choice of a strategy and the choice of an admissibility threshold.
Indeed, from Theorem 1, it follows that given an admissibility threshold in the set {1, 2a, 2b, 3}, if a
candidate would have been selected according to that threshold under total knowledge and if this candidate
is preferred by all the agents then it would also have been selected by these agents playing all the optimistic
strategy and using the same threshold:
Corollary 2 ∀c ∈ Ad under total knowledge with Ad ∈ {1, 2a, 2b, 3}, if ∀v ∈ V , v uses the optimistic
strategy and c ∈ C+v then c ∈ Ad under voted knowledge.
It follows from Corollary 1 that with the pessimistic strategy used by all the agents, the common utility
modeled by a BLF is ignored in favor of a unanimity of personal preferences if the admissibility threshold
is 2a (hence a good way to lower manipulation would be to rather choose the 2b threshold, forbidding the
pessimistic strategies to act against the common utility).
Corollary 3 If the group uses the threshold 2a (Nad ∪ Id) and if all agents are using the pessimistic
strategy and if c is s.t. ∀v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v then the candidate is accepted.
In a symmetric way, if no one wants to accept the candidate and if the threshold is 2a, the candidate can
be accepted in the Voted BLF.
The use of a BLF reflects that knowledge is power: since knowledge gives the power to advance facts
for triggering or inhibits DPs, this is why we are going to use a framework in which all the agents have the
same knowledge. More formally, K = Kv,∀v ∈ V . With equal knowledge the optimistic strategy is more
efficient since if there are pros and cons it will be the consensual BLF that will make the decision.
Proposition 6 ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∃v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v and ∃v′ ∈ V , c ∈ C−v′ , if all the agents use the optimistic
strategy and K = Kv,∀v ∈ V then V oted = K.
In the case where an agent is pro and another agent is con and the knowledge is the same for all agents,
the vote amounts to share all the knowledge in a neutral way, hence the candidate will have the same
admissibility as if there were no strategy.
Corollary 4 (Statuses under optimistic strategy 2) ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∃v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v and ∃v′ ∈ V , c ∈ C−v′ ,
∀Ad ∈ {1, 2a, 2b, 3}, if c ∈ Ad under total knowledge then c ∈ Ad under voted knowledge.
Let us consider now the pessimistic strategy under a shared equal knowledge.
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Proposition 7 ∀c ∈ C s.t. ∃v ∈ V , c ∈ C+v and ∃v′ ∈ V , c ∈ C−v , if all the agents use the pessimistic
strategy and K = Kv,∀v ∈ V then ∀Ad ∈ {1, 2a, 2b, 3}, if c ∈ Ad under total knowledge then c ∈
Nad ∪ Id ∪ Ct ∪N¬ad under voted knowledge.
From Corollary 4 and Proposition 7 it appears that the optimistic strategy is more rational and does
not depend on the structure of the BLF, since with pessimistic strategy c can have any status under voted
knowledge.
We are now going to compare the use of the optimistic or pessimistic strategy in the case where the
knowledge is the same for all and some agents are pro others are con. For this, we consider a problem with
two agents, the first one is pro the candidate and uses the optimistic strategy and the second one is con and
uses the pessimistic strategy.
Proposition 8 Let V = {v1, v2} with K = Kv1 = Kv2, ∀c ∈ C s.t. c ∈ C+v1 and c ∈ C−v2 with v1 (resp.
v2) using optimistic (resp. pessimistic) strategy, it holds that R⊕K ⊆ R⊕V oted and R	V oted ⊆ R	K and:
• c ∈ Nad under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad under voted knowledge
• c ∈ Ct under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad ∪ Ct under voted knowledge
• c ∈ Id under total knowledge then c ∈ Nad ∪ Id under voted knowledge
• c ∈ N¬ad under total knowledge then c may have any status under voted knowledge (c ∈ Nad∪Id∪
Ct ∪N¬ad).
Before closing this section about naive strategies, let us underline the fact that strategies are not well
suited with the collaborative spirit of the BLF, since, by strategy, a agent can choose to hide some infor-
mation that have been judged to be relevant for the realization of a common goal by all the group. Hence
using a strategy in order to favor a candidate may be viewed as a betrayal with respect to the group welfare.
4 Discussion and related work
In AI literature the bipolar view has often been used, inspired by the fact that human usually evaluate
the possible alternatives considering positive and negative aspects separately [9]. In the domain of multi-
criteria decision, Dubois and Fargier [10] propose a qualitative bipolar approach in which a candidate is
associated with two distinct sets of positive “arguments” (pros) and negative “arguments” (cons). This
polarity is given wrt the decision goal. The arguments are abstract and there is no relation between them,
but their level of importance is given. The papers [11, 8] study the use of decision rules in practice by human
decision makers, and show that the bipolar lexicographic rule is largely favored by humans. Another way
to deal with this kind of situation can be based on the maching between a post profile and each candidate.
When uncertainty is taken into account, this matching can be expressed by criteria based on the possibility
or necessity measure that the candidate matches the profile [13]. A drawback of these approaches is that it
requires to dispose of a precise possibility distribution about candidates and it implies a commensurability
between the preferences about the research profile and the uncertainty about the candidate. Moreover it is
difficult to define the threshold over which the candidate could be accepted.
The notion of “argument” in favor or against a decision has also been developped in practical argumen-
tation domain which has been widely studied (see e.g. [17, 1]). Practical argumentation aims at answering
the question “what is the right thing to do in a given situation” which is clearly related to a decision prob-
lem. Several works are using argumentative approaches to tackle it: for instance [6] have a very similar
view of what we call Principles, since they use defeasible rules in favor or against a given action, Amgoud
and Prade [2] propose a bipolar argumentation-based approach distinguishing epistemic and practical ar-
guments. Our decision principle can be viewed as a pair of (epistemic information, practical information)
which defines the practical conclusion that should be fired under the epistemic information.
Another theoretical framework has been proposed for multi-criteria / multi-agent (non sequential) deci-
sion making under possibilistic uncertainty [4, 5]. Our approach differs from classical approaches of group
decision under uncertainty on the following points: (i) our BLF is a kind of CUF, but it is a richer qualitative
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bipolar structure that takes into account available knowledge and not only agents’ utilities; (ii) our BLF is
based on justifications of why we should take one decision (since a DP contains the reasons for saying that
a given goal is achieved) while in standard CUF, utilities are given with no structured explanation; (iii) we
assume that agents have no uncertainty about what they know but they are uncertain about what the other
agents know.
In this paper, we consider that agents can provide only factual information and no information about
their preferences, since the BLF contains already importance levels and polarities that are assumed to reflect
the group utility. Hence the agents has only access to the information describing the candidates which
differs from classical utilitarian approaches. In this context, our paper studies what happens when agents
are not purely acting for the wellfare of the group, hence we take into account a second type of private
utility: the fact that an agent wants secretely to accept a candidate without considering the common BLF.
In this case, this kind of utility is personal and the agent does not want to agregate this information. This
differs from the aim to aggregate the utilities of the different agents used in the literature about collective
decision making. Our study shows that the BLF may help to reduce the possibilities of agents to influence
the decision that would have been taken for the wellfare of the group. Indeed for an agent it is very difficult
in our context to know what the other agents know and what they will utter hence to compute what goal
will be achieved after the vote of the group, and moreover to know the status that will get the candidate.
Concerning vote and manipulability, we plan to introduce reputation and blame, i.e., if an agent has
always access to some information and does not deliver it for a given candidate, then he can be accused
of attempting to manipulate the group decision. This could enforce agents to utter all the information they
know in order to behave better for the group. Another direction would be to extend the expressivity of
a BLF in order to incorporate the strength of a decision principle (which will both have an importance
relative to its goal, and a strength relative to the certainty of its conclusion when the reasons hold). A
possible extension would be to handle the agent’s uncertain knowledge about the situation, hence to allow
for features associated with uncertainty degrees. The question of how to build a BLF from different points
of view has been evoked in [12] but has not been developed yet. We plan to work on the subject of BLF
building with health decision makers in order to see how complicated it is for them to define decision
principles, inhibitors and importance relations.
Annex: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: In both definitions (Definition 8 and Definition 9) ∀f ∈ V otedsv it holds that
Kv ` f . Moreover K is supposed to be consistent and Kv ⊆ K. 
Proof of Proposition 2: It is straightforward from the definition of the pessimistic strategy that is based on
the optimistic one on which some more constraints are added. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us show that R⊕K ⊆ R⊕V oted, if g ∈ R⊕K then there exists an unhibited positive
DP with conclusion g, i.e., ∃(ϕ, g) ∈ P⊕K s.t. K ` ϕ and g ∈ ⊕ and @(ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ RK s.t. K ` ϕ′,
hence, ∀l ∈ LITK , s.t. K ` l, if l ∈ ϕ then l ∧ ϕ 0 ⊥ (since K is consistent), so l is voted with the
optimistic strategy. Moreover if @(ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ RK s.t. K ` ϕ′ then it is not possible that V oted ` ϕ′ s.t.
ϕ′ inhibits (ϕ, g) since K ` V oted and K is consistent. 
Proof of Proposition 4: If g is in R	V oted then it means that g is the conclusion of a negative DP (ϕ, g)
such that V oted ` ϕ and forall inhibitor ϕ′ s.t. (ϕ′, (ϕ, g)) ∈ RK , V oted 0 ϕ′, which means that K 0 ϕ′
unless by strategy agents would have inhibit the negative DP. It means that K ` ϕ since K ` V oted, and
K 0 ϕ′ for any inhibitor ϕ′ of the negative DP. Hence g ∈ RK . 
Proof of Theorem 1:
- c ∈ Nad under total knowledge implies R⊕eK 6= ∅ and R	eK = ∅. Using Proposition 3 we have R⊕eV oted 6=
∅ and due to Proposition 4, R	eV oted = ∅, hence the result.
- c ∈ Ct under total knowledge implies R⊕eK 6= ∅ and R	eK 6= ∅. Using Proposition 3, we have R⊕eV oted 6=
∅ and due to Proposition 4, R	eV oted = ∅ or R
	
eV oted 6= ∅, hence the result.
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- c ∈ Id under total knowledge implies R⊕K = ∅ and R	K = ∅. Using Proposition 3, we have R⊕V oted 6= ∅
or R⊕V oted = ∅ and due to Proposition 4, R
	
V oted = ∅, hence the result.
- c ∈ N¬ad under total knowledge implies R⊕eK = ∅ and R	eK 6= ∅. Using Proposition 3 we have
R⊕eV oted 6= ∅ or R⊕eV oted = ∅ and due to Proposition 4 R	eV oted = ∅ or R	eV oted 6= ∅. 
Proof of Proposition 5: If g ∈ R	V oted then ∃(ϕ, g) ∈ P	K s.t. K ` ϕ hence for all f ∈ LITK s.t. K ` f ,
if f ∈ ϕ then f ∧ ϕ 0 ⊥ hence f is not voted, hence V oted 0 ϕ i.e., g 6∈ R	V oted. 
Proof of Corollary 1: From proposition 5 we know that R	V oted = ∅, hence the result. 
Proof of Corollary 3: Follows from Corollary 1. 
Proof of Prop 6: Since v and v′ have the same knowledge K, and v is pro c it means that all facts that
appear in a positive DP or that inhibits a negative DP will be uttered. Symmetrically, v′ being con c′
means that all facts appearing in a negative DP or inhibiting a positive one will be uttered as well. Hence
V oted = K. 
Proof of Proposition 7: The proof consists in giving examples of all the possibilities. 
Proof of Proposition 8: Let us proove that R⊕K ⊆ R⊕V oted, if g ∈ R⊕K then it means that ∃(ϕ, g) ∈ P⊕K s.t.
(ϕ, g) is not inhibited in the K-valid BLF. Hence v1 has voted every literal in ϕ and (ϕ, g) is not inhibited
in V oted (since v2 has no way to inhibit it). Thus, g ∈ R⊕V oted.
Let us proove that R	V oted ⊆ R	K , if g ∈ R	V oted then ∃(ϕ, g) ∈ PV otedo	 s.t. (ϕ, g) is not inhibited
in the V oted-valid BLF. This DP can come from v2’s or v1’s votes since v2 may have utter facts against c
when none of those facts can be used positively, but it can also come from v1 if these facts belong also to
positive DPs. There are two possibilities when (ϕ, g) is not inhibited in the Voted-valid BLF, either there is
no inhibitor in K then g ∈ R	K or the inhibitor exists in K but it has not been voted. However, since v1 has
an optimistic strategy and is pro c, v1 would have voted any fact that appear in an inhibitor of a negative
DP, hence this case is impossible. 
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